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Abstract 
 
Anthropology was originally conceived as a bridge between the natural and social 
sciences. Its remit was to fill in the gaps in knowledge about human history between 
the emergence of our species and the appearance of the first civilizations in written 
history. However, this project soon became embroiled in a destructive debate between 
"evolutionists" and "diffusionists". The evolutionists believed that cross-cultural 
similarities in social organisation, subsistence technology, etc. were independently 
discovered by societies as they progressed toward higher stages of civilization. The 
diffusionists, on the other hand, argued that most cultural innovations were invented 
only once and spread from their point of origin through migration or contact between 
societies. While the diffusionists ultimately won that debate, their critique of classical 
social evolutionism did not extend to Darwinian approaches to culture and were in 
fact highly compatible with the latter. The failure of Darwinian theory to take root in 
social anthropology can be explained by a critique of diffusionism launched by Boas 
and his followers, which has only recently been challenged. Modern phylogenetic 
analysis of culture provides a new approach for resolving the evolutionist-diffusionist 
debate, and promises to deliver the still unfulfilled goals of the Victorian founders of 
anthropology. 
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The past of the evolutionary taxonomy of cultures 
 
Today, most anthropologists maintain a strong division between the study of human 
biological diversity on the one hand and cultural diversity on the other. Yet the 
Victorian founders of the discipline recognised no such distinction. For them, 
ethnography belonged as much to the natural sciences as the social sciences. Indeed, 
Charles Darwin drew extensively on descriptions of the lives of so-called “primitive” 
peoples, whom he believed provided a crucial link between modern humans and their 
closest living relatives. Darwin emphasised that the need to collect data on these 
societies was especially urgent because the advancing empires of Europe were wiping 
out many of the indigenous cultures of the Americas, Pacific and Africa: “At some 
future period the civilised races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace 
the savage races throughout the world. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes 
will no doubt be exterminated. The break [between man and other primates] will then 
be rendered wider, for it will intervene between man in some more civilised state than 
the Caucasian and some ape as low as a baboon, instead of as at present between the 
negro or Australian and the gorilla” (Darwin 2005 [1871]: 743). 
 
While this passage from The Descent of Man has not aged well, it is important to 
place it in a proper context. Darwin’s point was not that “savages” are closer to 
gorillas than they are to western Europeans, but to emphasise the continuities among 
all humans as well as other primates. As Desmond and Moore (2009) have shown in 
their recent book, Darwin was a passionate opponent of polygenism – the theory that 
human races evolved independently of one another in different regions of the world 
and could therefore be effectively treated as though they were separate species. 
Polygenism was firmly ensconced in the British anthropological establishment, with 
both the presidents of both the Ethnological Society of London and the 
Anthropological Society of London confirmed subscribers (Stocking 1968). Across 
the Atlantic, polygenism had similarly strong academic credentials, which were 
mobilised in support of slavery (ibid.). In arguing for a common origin for all of 
humankind, Darwin rejected the very basis of polygenism, and emphasised instead the 
strong continuities that exist among all peoples, which he found affirmed by his own 
experiences: “The American aborigines, Negroes and Europeans are as different from 
each other as any three races that can be named; yet I was incessantly struck whilst 
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living among the Feugians on board the Beagle, with the many little traits of character 
shewing how similar their minds were to ours; and so it was with a full-blooded negro 
with whom I happened once to be intimate…” (Darwin 2005: 741). 
 
Thus, whereas the polygenists saw non-industrial peoples as separate and inferior 
species that could never be educated to European levels, Darwin thought that humans 
everywhere share a common potential, which has been realised to different degrees in 
different places. This idea had its roots in Enlightenment thinking on the unity and 
perfectibility of man, encapsulated by the German philosopher Johann Gottfried 
Herder’s comment that “a few centuries only had elapsed since the inhabitants of 
Germany were Patagonians” (1800:164). A more proximal influence was the social 
evolutionism advocated by pioneering anthropologists such as Edward B. Tylor, John 
Lubbock and John McLennan. These writers proposed that societies could be ordered 
into a linear series from the most primitive to the most advanced, with each one 
representing the last historical stage of its successor, regardless of their actual 
temporal or geographical relationships. Thus, Tylor claimed that “the institutions of 
man are as distinctly stratified as the earth on which he lives. They succeed each other 
in series substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what seem the 
comparatively superficial differences of race and language, but shaped by similar 
human nature acting through successively changed conditions in savage, barbaric, and 
civilized life” (1889:269). 
 
The key criterion for ordering societies was their perceived level of technological 
complexity. Thus, savage societies that depend on foraging for their subsistence are 
characterised by simple tools for hunting and butchering, and by a material culture 
that is closely based on natural forms (e.g. Pitt Rivers 1875). The stage of 
barbarianism, as represented by pastoral nomad tribes of Central Asia or Polynesian 
chiefdoms, was ushered in by the domestication of wild plants and animals and the 
invention of metallurgy, which together allowed for the production of economic 
surpluses, hierarchical social structures, and advanced weapons. Last of all, the 
discoveries of geometry and writing allowed large trading networks and bureaucracies 
to evolve, paving the way for civilised states and empires like Rome and Egypt (e.g. 
Tylor 1881, Morgan 1877). While technological progress was seen as the main driver 
of social evolution, there was considerable debate about the exact course taken by the 
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latter. The evolution of kinship and marriage systems was a particular source of 
argument. For example, in Ancient Law, Henry Maine (1861) disputed the idea 
popularised by the French Enlightment philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1762) 
that human society originated through the social contracts among free individuals. 
Instead, he argued from ethnographic evidence that the first societies were made up 
by groups of families in which individuals’ rights and obligations were determined by 
their status as husbands, wives, sons, etc. Maine’s hypothesis was challenged by 
Lewis Henry Morgan, one of the founders of modern anthropology in the USA. 
Morgan’s comparative analysis of kinship terminologies from around the world 
(1877), and particularly the indigenous peoples of the Americas, led him to conclude 
that the institution of the family was in fact a relatively recent invention. The low 
level of paternity certainty in primitive societies meant that infants rarely knew who 
their real biological father was. Consequently, they would refer to all men of an older 
generation as “father”. Morgan suggested that this system gradually evolved into one 
where particular groups of men mated with particular groups of women, giving rise to 
clan-based systems of social organisation. It was only after the invention of private 
property that men began to control female reproduction so as to pass on goods to their 
biological sons. This resulted in a shift from “classificatory” kinship terminologies, 
which conflated different kinds of biological relationships (e.g. father, father’s 
brother, father’s father’s brother’s son), to “descriptive” kinship terminologies, where 
relations reflect true patterns of genetic relatedness (Morgan 1877, see Kuper 2005 for 
a comparison and discussion of Morgan and Maine’s ideas). 
 
Unfortunately, the patchy state of the archaeological record meant that nineteenth 
century anthropologists had little direct evidence to test competing hypotheses about 
the direction of social evolution. Instead, they were forced to reconstruct the past 
using largely contemporary data. The most innovative and successful example of this 
approach was the “doctrine of survivals” developed by Edward Tylor (e.g. 1871, 
1889). Tylor defined survivals as “processes, customs, opinions and so forth which 
have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in 
which they had their original home” (1871:16). Examples included folktales, 
proverbs, rituals and children’s games. Whereas most of Tylor’s contemporaries saw 
these traditions as trivial or anachronistic, he believed that they preserved important 
information about the lives and institutions of ancestral societies. This was 
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exemplified by his analysis of the couvade (1889). Couvade practices are widespread 
in the ethnographic record and involve a man adopting taboos and other ritual 
observances of his wife during her pregnancy, and sometimes even simulating labour 
during the birth itself. According to a theory advanced by Bachofen (1861), the 
couvade expresses the earliest stage of the recognition of paternity, whereby fathers 
are represented as “second mothers”. Bachofen speculated that the couvade is 
therefore associated with a transition from matrilineal to a patrilineal kinship system. 
Tylor tested this hypothesis by analysing the distribution of the couvade in societies 
with different kinship systems. He found that the majority of societies that practiced 
the couvade had a combined matrilineal and patrilineal (i.e. bilateral) system of 
descent. A significant minority of societies had a patrilineal system, while none had a 
matrilineal system. Tylor concluded that this pattern fitted the predictions of 
Bachofen’s hypothesis: the presence of the couvade in some patrilineal societies 
represented a survival from an earlier, transitional stage of societal development. 
Meanwhile, the absence of the couvade in matrilineal societies demonstrated that 
matriliny is a more primitive form of social organisation: “The argument is a 
geological one. Just as the forms of life, and even the actual fossils, of the 
Carboniferous formation may be traced to the Permian, but the Permian types and 
fossils are absent from the Carboniferous strata formed before they came into 
existence, so here couvade, which, if the maternal system had been later than the 
paternal, would have lasted on into it, prove by their absence the priority of the 
maternal” (Tylor 1889:257). 
 
  
From evolutionism to diffusionism 
 
Although Darwin and Tylor were united on the question of the monogenesis of 
humankind and enthusiastically drew on each other’s fields to support their own 
theories, their ideas were in many other respects incompatible. Whereas Darwin’s 
idea of natural selection proposed that the evolution of species occurred through 
adaptation to external pressures, Tylor, Morgan and other social evolutionists believed 
that the development of civilisation was driven by an internal impetus – the inevitable 
fulfilment of humanity’s inherent intellectual and moral potential. In that sense, 
cultural evolution was conceived in ontogenetic, rather than phylogenetic terms, a 
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process of maturation, rather than descent with modification. This was reflected in 
Tylor’s frequent comparison between “savages” and children, and his tendency to 
refer to “culture” as a singular entity that was possessed to different degrees by 
different peoples, rather than to “cultures” as distinct, bounded entities analogous to 
species (Stocking 1968: 91- 110). These theoretical differences were reflected in 
biological and social evolutionary taxonomic systems, which were almost perfect 
mirror images of one another. In the former case, species are grouped according to 
traits that were inherited from common ancestor, rather than similarities that evolved 
separately (i.e. convergences). In contrast, the classification of “savages”, 
“barbarians” and “civilisations” was based on discoveries made independently in each 
society (e.g. fire, pottery, metallurgy, writing, etc.). Although, as Tylor had shown, 
inherited behaviours (i.e. survivals) could be useful for reconstructing sequences of 
evolution, they were nonetheless seen as anomalies from a taxonomic point of view, 
rather than a basis for classification. 
 
However, by the early twentieth century, the social evolutionary theorists were 
coming under an increasing challenge from a new school of anthropology known as 
“diffusionism”. The diffusionists developed the modern conception of culture that 
saw it as much a product of learning and communication as discovery and invention. 
They argued that similarities and differences among cultures can be better explained 
in terms of historical patterns of migration and contact, rather than some vaguely 
understood continuum of mental development (e.g. Bloch 2005). Initially, the 
difference between diffusionism and social evolutionism was more a matter of 
emphasis. Tylor himself recognised the potential for new technologies to spread 
across societies, and devoted a substantial section of the first chapter of Primitive 
Culture (1871) to examples of these patterns. However, he did not appear to realise 
the possible implications they had for his general theory of cultural evolution. These 
were spelled out by Sir Francis Galton, who chaired the meeting of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute where Tylor presented his findings on the couvade. Galton 
reflected that “it was extremely desirable for the sake of those who may wish to study 
the evidence for Dr. Tylor’s conclusions that full information should be given as to 
the degree in which the customs of the tribes and races which are compared together 
are independent. It might be that some of the tribes had derived them from a common 
source, so that they were duplications of the same original” (Tylor 1889:270). In other 
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words, correlations (or to use Tylor’s term, “adhesions”) between cultural traits (e.g. 
couvade and bilateral kinship norms) may be due to them having been acquired from 
the same source, rather than a functional relationship. Somewhat ironically, the 
diffusionists came to these conclusions independently of Galton. The most extreme 
form of diffusionism (“hyper-diffusionism”) held that all the technologies and 
institutions associated with civilised societies had a single common source, which 
could be traced back to Ancient Egypt (e.g. Elliot Smith 1911). More moderate 
diffusionists (e.g. Rivers 1914), influenced by the German kulturkriese (“culture 
circles”) school, argued that culture spread from several points of origin. Although it 
was often difficult to identify source cultures with any degree of precision, 
diffusionism effectively became the default position in anthropology and almost 
completely displaced previous assumptions that similar cultures evolved 
independently. 
 
Although diffusionism was incompatible with social evolutionism, it interesting to 
consider its parallels with Darwinian theory. The idea that human institutions and 
technologies diversified from source cultures has clear resonances with Darwin’s 
notion that all life forms were related by descent from an original common ancestor. 
In fact, Darwin had already floated the idea that cultures could be classified into 
hierarchical taxonomic groupings similar to biological families, genera, etc. based on 
their descent relationships. In a now famous passage in The Descent of Man, he 
observed that “the formation of different languages and of distinct species and the 
proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process are curiously 
parallel.” (Darwin 2005 [1871]: 676). This idea was taken up – or possibly even 
anticipated by – August Schleicher (1869), the founder of modern historical 
linguistics. Schleicher hypothesised that relationships among the Indo-European 
languages could be directly modelled on the kind of tree diagrams used by Darwin to 
depict the phylogeny of biological species. Similarly, the collector and anthropologist 
Henry Augustus Pitt Rivers was convinced that material culture variation was a 
product of Darwinian processes of descent with modification. As he explained, 
“human ideas, as represented by the various products of human industry, are capable 
of classification into genera, species, and varieties, in the same manner as the products 
of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and in their development from the 
homogeneous to the heterogeneous they obey the same laws” (Pitt Rivers 1875:307). 
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As with species and languages, Pitt Rivers believed that it was possible to trace the 
development of artefacts that were widely distributed throughout the globe to their 
original “root form”. For example, he argued that similarities among cross-bows made 
in different societies across Europe and Asia suggested that these traditions were all 
derived from a single proto-cross-bow. His theory was tested by Henry Balfour 
(1889), who literally dissected the cross bow collections with the methodical rigour 
that we might expect of someone who had first been trained in comparative anatomy. 
Balfour’s efforts produced the first phylogeny of a material culture tradition that was 
explicitly based on the branching ‘family tree’ models employed by biologists and 
historical linguists (Figure 1). It suggested that the cross-bow originated in Central 
Asia and was then adapted by populations as it spread north to the Arctic regions and 
then west into Siberia and across the Bering Strait into America, west to Persia and 
Europe, and south to the Indian subcontinent. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Despite the example of these studies, diffusionism did not give rise to a Darwinian 
taxonomy of cultures in anthropology. Instead, for most of the last century, most 
social anthropologists have rejected any sort of analogy between biological and 
cultural inheritance. Their objection is based on the observation that, whereas physical 
traits can only be transmitted from parents to their offspring, cultural traits can be 
borrowed from any number of sources. Moreover, whereas members of other species 
are not usually able to interbreed with one another, there are no inherent constraints 
on communication among humans belonging to different social groups. Consequently, 
Franz Boas, the founder of modern American social anthropology, claimed that 
“animal forms develop in divergent directions, and an intermingling of species that 
have once become distinct is negligible in the whole developmental history. It is 
otherwise in the domain of culture. Human thoughts, institutions, activities may 
spread from one social unit to another. As soon as two groups come into close contact 
their cultural traits will be disseminated from one to the other” (1940:251). This 
contrast was famously depicted by Kroeber (1948) in his diagram ‘The Tree of Life 
and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil’ (Figure 2). Whereas the branches 
on the tree of life grow and then split, those on the tree of culture are tangled together 
and often merge. Researchers following in this tradition continue to argue that the 
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tree-like models of species relationships are therefore an inappropriate representation 
of cultural history. Instead, they propose that the latter could be more accurately 
compared to an ‘entangled bank’ (Terrell 1988) or ‘braided river bed’ (Moore 1994). 
If the emergence of diffusionism is the reason why anthropology isn’t Tylorian, then 
we can say that the critique of diffusionism by Boas and his followers explains why it 
didn’t become Darwinian either. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The present and future of the evolutionary taxonomy of cultures 
 
How valid was the critique of diffusionism? Recent applications of biological 
phylogenetic analysis suggest that, contrary to the assumptions of Boas and Kroeber, 
it is often possible to trace coherent lineages of cultural descent with modification 
over many hundreds of years. A number of these studies have focused on 
relationships among languages, and found strong support for Schleicher’s hypothesis 
that language families grow by branching processes of diversification, usually 
resulting from population dispersals (e.g. Rexová et al. 2003, Gray & Atkinson 2003, 
Gray & Jordan 2000, Holden 2002). Applications of phylogenetics to material culture 
data, on the other hand, have borne out Pitt-Rivers’ belief that the crafts and 
technologies of different populations are often linked by common descent, and can be 
traced back to their original root forms. Examples include prehistoric stone tools 
(Buchanan and Collard 2007, O’Brien and Lyman 2003, Lycett 2007, 2009), ancient 
scripts (Skelton 2008), textiles (Tehrani and Collard 2002, 2009, Tehrani et al. in 
press) and musical instruments (Temkin 2004, Temkin and Eldredge 2007). 
 
These studies indicate that anthropologists have tended to overestimate the differences 
between biological and cultural evolution. Indeed, ethnographic studies contradict the 
idea that sources of cultural learning are necessarily much more diverse than sources 
of genetic inheritance. Instead, they suggest that in most non-industrial contexts 
individuals initially acquire their core skills from a single role model or ‘cultural 
parent’, who is often also their biological parent (e.g. Hewlett & Cavalli-Sforza 1986, 
Shennan and Steele 1999, Tehrani and Riede 2008). Second, it is important to take 
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into account that even when individuals do acquire traits from multiple individuals, 
this does not automatically lead to widespread cultural borrowing and blending 
among populations. Whereas horizontal transmission among members of the same 
group is facilitated by their physical proximity, pressure to conform and shared norms 
and language and shared cultural norms, communication among members of different 
groups is often impeded by the existence of ecological boundaries, language barriers, 
endogamy and out-group prejudices (e.g. Durham 1992, Gil-White, 2001). 
 
This point is illustrated by a recent study I carried out with Mark Collard on the 
evolution of Iranian tribal weaving traditions (Tehrani and Collard 2009). 
Ethnographic observation and interviews with weavers suggest that there are 
important differences in the way that different types of craft knowledge are 
transmitted among individuals. Whereas weavers learn techniques during childhood 
from their mothers, they continue learning designs throughout their lifetime and often 
adopt new patterns from unrelated weavers. However, a phylogenetic analysis of 
these traits showed that, as far as inter-group patterns of variation are concerned, 
designs have just as strong a descent signature as techniques. The reason for this is 
that endogamy and social norms restricting the movement of women mean that 
weavers have few opportunities to interact with members of other tribes, with the 
result that designs tend to circulate within, rather than across, ethnic boundaries. We 
also found evidence that even when there were opportunities to copy patterns from 
external sources (through participation in commercial textile production), they appear 
to have had little effect on weaving traditions. This is in line with the suggestion put 
forward by cultural evolutionary theorists that social learning is often heavily 
influenced by a tendency to conform, which helps to sustain lasting cultural 
differences among populations even in the face of trade and interaction (e.g. Henrich 
& Boyd 1998). Consequently, despite the clear differences in the mechanisms of 
cultural and genetic transmission at the individual level, group-level patterns of 
biological and cultural diversity can be highly similar (e.g. Collard et a. 2006). 
 
Of course, this is not to suggest that populations never exchange cultural traits with 
one another. Researchers in this area recognise that horizontal transmission among 
groups, like independent invention, is likely to be an important source of conflicting 
signal in their analyses. Nevertheless, simulations (e.g. Greenhill et al. 2009) have 
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shown that phylogenetic methods are robust under realistic levels of borrowing 
among societies. Empirical studies similarly show that, even in cases where there is 
extensive borrowing and blending among neighboring groups, as among Californian 
Indian basket-weavers, they do not appear to have completely wiped out all traces of 
cultural descent (Jordan & Shennan 2003). A more fundamental issue is how far 
phylogenetic analysis of cultural traits can be used to infer population histories (e.g. 
Rogers et al. 2009). The difficulty here is that since genes and cultural traits are 
transmitted via separate mechanisms (i.e. biological reproduction versus social 
learning) they may evolve and split at different rates, leading to divergences between 
the two systems (Tehrani et al. in press). Furthermore, many of the cultural ideas and 
practices that are transmitted within groups may have initially been acquired from an 
external source. The above example of carpet weaving in Iranian tribal groups is a 
case in point. Although Iranian-speaking groups in the Zagros Mountains appear to 
have inherited their traditions from a common ancestral tribe, ethnohistorical and 
linguistic evidence suggests that this ancestral group probably borrowed the craft 
from incoming Turkic peoples about 500 years ago. This is in keeping with the 
expectations of the diffusionists, who believed that culture spread through both 
population dispersals and contact between groups.  
 
However, there is one important issue on which cultural phylogenetics departs from 
diffusionism. It concerns the role of independent evolution. To recall the earlier 
discussion, diffusionists rejected any notion that similar institutions and technologies 
evolved independently, which was the central hypothesis of progressive evolutionist 
theory. However, as Galton realised, the dichotomy of diffusion versus independent 
invention is a false one. For it is precisely through identifying what he called 
“duplications” that we are able to locate true instances of independent change in 
different societies. Far from being incompatible, diffusion and convergence are two 
sides of the same coin. To date, efforts to address Galton’s problem in a phylogenetic 
context have used language trees to control for relatedness among populations. Thus, 
if a given institution or cultural practice is found in two populations that speak closely 
related languages but is absent in a third population that speaks a less closely related 
language then it is assumed that the former two groups inherited the trait from a 
common ancestor. Conversely, when a practice is found in two groups that are 
distantly related but is lacking in their close relatives, it can be assumed to have arisen 
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independently. This approach makes it possible to investigate issues that were central 
to the concerns of Victorian social evolutionists like Tylor and Morgan, such as the 
correlated evolution (“adhesion”) of economic practices and social organisation. For 
example, Holden and Mace (2003) tested the hypothesis that pastoralism is associated 
with patrilineal inheritance systems in Africa by mapping both traits onto a language 
tree of Bantu populations. Their findings suggested that not only is there a correlation 
between pastoralism and patriliny, but that the relationship is causal: the adoption of 
cattle in matrilineal groups generally results in a shift toward a patrilineal system of 
wealth inheritance. This is because men can better defend herds against raiders, and 
often use livestock as bridewealth to obtain wives. Consequently, the transfer of 
livestock to sons confers greater fitness benefits than transfer to daughters (Holden et 
al. 2003). Phylogenetic comparative methods have been used to shed light on several 
other classical anthropological questions, including the evolution of bridewealth and 
dowry (e.g. Fortunato et al. 2006) and postmarital residence norms (Jordan et al. 
2009). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is often said that academic disciplines are destined to forever go round in circles. 
Ideas that were rejected by one generation are often reinvented or recycled by the 
next, before once more falling by the wayside. In the case of anthropology, efforts to 
revive the evolutionary ideas of Tylor and Morgan (e.g. White 1959) have generally 
been short-lived, snuffed out by the long shadow of diffusionism. However, diffusion 
and independent invention should not be seen as mutually exclusive explanations for 
human cultural diversity. Modern phylogenetic approaches to culture recognise the 
potential roles of both processes, the relative importance of which can be established 
on a case-by-case basis. By resolving the debate between diffusionism and social 
evolutionism, anthropologists working in this area are beginning to reclaim the 
original mission of their discipline. Yet, in travelling this particular circle, we do not 
find ourselves exactly where we started: Whereas Darwin thought that models of 
social evolution could illuminate the biological history of humans, cultural 
phylogenetics uses a biological model to study cultural histories. Thus the relationship 
between biological and social anthropology has been turned on its head. Many 
anthropologists will no doubt object to the new evolutionary taxonomy of cultures for 
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the same reasons that Boas did. Yet there are reasons to be optimistic. As Tylor 
pointed out, although old ways of thinking can survive long after they are useful, they 
usually die out eventually. 
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Figure 1. Branching lineages drawn by Darwin (1837) for species (a), Schleicher 
(1869) for Indo-European languages (b) and Balfour (1889) for cross-bows (c). 
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Figure 2. Kroeber’s ‘Tree of Life and Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil – That 
is, of Human Culture’ (Kroeber 1948). 
 
